Power, Ideology, Institutions and the Crisis of Constitutional Democracy
SR Darapuri I.P.S.(Retd)
(Asian independent) The question of whether India has become a “Deeper State” requires us to look beyond the conventional understanding of political power. A government may become stronger because it commands a parliamentary majority, controls administrative machinery, or exercises greater coercive capacity. A deeper state, however, represents something qualitatively different. It emerges when formal institutions of the state become increasingly interconnected with informal ideological, social and organisational networks operating within society. Power is then exercised not only through government institutions but also through networks that penetrate society and, in turn, influence the functioning of the state.
Christophe Jaffrelot’s analysis of the making of a Hindu nationalist “deeper state” in India provides an important framework for understanding this phenomenon. His argument is that the contemporary Indian political order cannot be understood solely through the electoral success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The deeper transformation involves the interaction of formal state institutions—particularly the police and lower judiciary—with Hindu nationalist organisations and vigilante networks rooted in society. The significance of this development lies in the blurring of the boundaries between the political executive, state institutions, ideological organisations and social mobilisation.
The concept of the deeper state therefore needs to be distinguished from both a strong state and a conventional deep state. A strong state possesses greater administrative and coercive capacity. A conventional deep state refers to informal or hidden networks operating within or behind formal state institutions. A deeper state goes beyond both. It describes a configuration in which ideological networks embedded in civil society become connected with formal institutions, enabling political power to operate simultaneously through the state and through society.
This distinction is particularly relevant to the Indian case because the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) historically developed a strategy that went beyond electoral politics. Its extensive network of shakhas and affiliated organisations sought to organise and influence society at the grassroots. The BJP subsequently became the principal electoral and governmental vehicle of Hindu nationalism. The combination of governmental power with a pre-existing social and organisational infrastructure created a political configuration considerably deeper than an ordinary party-government relationship.
The crucial question, therefore, is not whether the RSS and its affiliates influence politics. Political influence by social organisations is normal in a democracy. The more important question is whether ideological organisations and informal networks are increasingly able to influence the exercise of state authority itself.
This issue becomes particularly visible in the phenomenon of vigilantism. Organisations and activists claiming to defend Hindu religious or cultural interests have, in various contexts, taken upon themselves functions resembling informal policing. Campaigns relating to cow protection, interfaith relationships, religious conversion and other issues have sometimes involved surveillance, intimidation, violence and social coercion. Jaffrelot’s argument is significant because he does not treat vigilantism simply as independent mob activity. He draws attention to its interaction with formal state institutions. Where police authorities tolerate, accommodate or selectively respond to such activities, the distinction between lawful enforcement and ideological enforcement begins to erode.
In a constitutional democracy, coercive authority belongs to institutions established by law. Police investigate offences, prosecutors prosecute, courts determine guilt and governments administer according to constitutional and statutory authority. Private organisations cannot legitimately assume these functions merely because they claim to represent religious or cultural interests. When they do so, and when the formal state fails to restrain them, a parallel system of authority begins to develop.
This is one of the clearest characteristics of a deeper state: informal social power begins to perform functions normally reserved for formal constitutional institutions.
The problem becomes even more serious when there is selective enforcement of the law. The issue is not whether every police officer or judge is ideologically committed to Hindutva. Such a claim would be both excessive and empirically difficult to sustain. The institutional question is whether citizens receive equal protection regardless of their religion, caste, political affiliation or social status. If members of a politically dominant community or ideological network are treated more leniently than minorities, Dalits, dissenters or political opponents, the constitutional promise of equality before law is undermined.
This also raises the question of institutional autonomy. A constitutional state depends upon institutions that can act according to law even when their decisions are politically inconvenient. Police independence, prosecutorial impartiality, judicial autonomy and a professional civil service are therefore not technical matters; they are essential safeguards against the conversion of electoral power into unrestricted political power.
The lower judiciary is especially important because ordinary citizens experience the constitutional order primarily through subordinate courts and local administration. If ideological or political pressures influence policing, prosecution or judicial decision-making at this level, constitutional rights may become practically inaccessible even when they remain formally guaranteed.
The deeper-state thesis must consequently be assessed not through isolated incidents but through patterns: patterns of selective policing, differential prosecution, institutional impunity, political protection, intimidation of dissenters and unequal access to justice. Only such systematic evidence can establish whether the deeper state is becoming an enduring institutional reality.
From an Ambedkarite perspective, the question assumes an even greater significance. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar did not regard democracy merely as a method for choosing governments. For him, democracy required a constitutional and social order based on liberty, equality and fraternity. Political democracy could not survive indefinitely if social relations remained deeply unequal and if constitutional institutions were subordinated to extra-constitutional authority.
Ambedkar’s warning that democracy must exist “not merely in form, but also in fact” is particularly relevant. Elections alone cannot guarantee democracy. A country may continue to hold elections while constitutional morality, institutional independence, minority protection and equality before law gradually deteriorate.
The deeper-state phenomenon should therefore be understood as a challenge to constitutional democracy rather than simply to electoral competition.
The Constitution establishes a universal conception of citizenship. The state belongs equally to all citizens, irrespective of religion, caste, language or political affiliation. Hindu nationalism, by contrast, places the idea of a Hindu cultural nation at the centre of its political imagination. The existence of such an ideology within democratic politics is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Political movements are entitled to advocate competing visions of society. The constitutional problem arises when one ideological conception of the nation becomes embedded in the functioning of state institutions and results in unequal citizenship.
This is where the distinction between majoritarian politics and majoritarian state power becomes crucial. A political party can win a majority through constitutional elections. But electoral victory does not confer unlimited authority. The majority government remains bound by fundamental rights, constitutional procedures, judicial review, institutional checks and the principle of equality.
When majoritarian political power is reinforced by informal ideological networks capable of exerting pressure upon society and state institutions, however, the normal boundaries of democratic power begin to change. The danger is that the electoral majority may acquire not merely governmental power but an extensive social infrastructure of coercion, mobilisation and cultural enforcement.
For Dalits and other historically marginalised communities, this issue has an additional dimension. Ambedkar understood Indian society as a system of graded inequality, in which formal equality could coexist with deeply entrenched social hierarchies. A state that formally guarantees equality but permits dominant social groups to exercise informal coercive authority can reproduce inequality without explicitly discriminatory legislation.
The deeper state may therefore reproduce hierarchy through the interaction of social dominance and state power. Its consequences are not limited to religious minorities. Dalits, Adivasis, women, workers, interfaith couples, political dissenters and other vulnerable groups may all be affected when informal majoritarian authority is permitted to operate alongside, or within, formal state institutions.
The deeper danger is consequently the transformation of the citizen’s relationship with the state. In a constitutional democracy, an individual should be able to approach the police, administration and courts as an equal citizen. But if people begin to believe that their protection depends upon caste, religion, political connections or proximity to powerful ideological organisations, citizenship becomes unequal in practice.
The result is a subtle but profound inversion of constitutional authority: instead of society being governed exclusively through constitutional institutions, constitutional institutions increasingly become responsive to organised social power.
It would nevertheless be premature to conclude that India has become a fully consolidated deeper state. Constitutional institutions continue to function. Elections remain competitive and politically consequential. Opposition parties govern several states. Courts continue, in many instances, to protect constitutional rights and restrain executive action. Civil society organisations, journalists, lawyers, activists and citizens continue to challenge governmental decisions. These institutional and social counterforces remain significant.
The more defensible conclusion is therefore that India is experiencing the formation and expansion of a deeper-state configuration, rather than that the constitutional state has disappeared. The evidence becomes particularly significant where there is sustained interaction among Hindu nationalist ideological networks, grassroots mobilisation, vigilantism, political protection and formal state enforcement.
The challenge is thus not simply whether India is becoming authoritarian. The deeper-state concept identifies a more specific transformation: the interpenetration of ideological society and formal state institutions. It explains how political power can become embedded beyond the government itself.
This distinction also suggests what democratic reform must accomplish. The objective cannot simply be to weaken the state. India requires an effective state, but one whose effectiveness is exercised within constitutional limits. The essential task is to reconstitutionalise state power.
The police must be professionally insulated from political and communal pressures and must provide equal protection to every citizen. Vigilante groups must be treated as private actors subject to ordinary criminal law rather than as informal extensions of cultural or political authority. Prosecution must be impartial, and political influence over investigations must be minimised. Judicial independence, particularly at the subordinate level, must be strengthened. Civil servants and police officers who act according to law must receive institutional protection when confronting politically influential groups. Legislatures must exercise meaningful oversight over coercive institutions, while citizens must have effective remedies against abuse of state power.
Above all, India needs a renewed commitment to constitutional morality. Constitutional morality requires political actors and citizens alike to accept that electoral majorities are not sovereign over constitutional rights. Political power is legitimate only when exercised within constitutional boundaries.
This is where Ambedkar’s conception of democracy remains indispensable. Democracy cannot survive through institutions alone. It requires a social ethic of fraternity in which citizens recognise one another as equals. Liberty without equality permits domination; equality without liberty produces conformity; and both remain fragile without fraternity.
The question “Has India become a Deeper State?” should therefore not be answered with a simple yes or no. The more accurate conclusion is that India shows important characteristics of an emerging Hindu nationalist deeper-state configuration, particularly where organised ideological networks intersect with policing, administration, political authority and other institutions of the state.
The significance of Jaffrelot’s argument lies precisely here. It shifts the debate from the question of who wins elections to the deeper question of how power is organised, embedded and exercised throughout the state and society.
The future of Indian constitutional democracy will depend upon whether the boundaries between ideological mobilisation and constitutional authority can be restored. The Republic can accommodate competing political ideologies, including Hindu nationalism, only so long as the state remains constitutionally neutral in its treatment of citizens and its institutions remain accountable to law.
The real test of democracy is therefore not merely whether governments change through elections. It is whether the citizen remains more powerful than the ideological organisation, the Constitution remains above the political majority, and law remains above informal social power.
In this sense, the struggle over the deeper state is ultimately a struggle over the meaning of the Indian Republic itself: whether India will remain a constitutional democracy founded on equal citizenship, liberty, equality and fraternity, or whether formal democratic institutions will increasingly coexist with an informal majoritarian order capable of penetrating and reshaping the state from within and below.
