Power, Ideology, Institutions and the Crisis of Constitutional Democracy
SR Darapuri I.P.S.(Retd)
(Asian independent) India remains a parliamentary democracy. Elections are held regularly, governments change through electoral processes, opposition parties govern several states, Parliament and the judiciary continue to function, and citizens enjoy constitutionally guaranteed rights. Yet democracy cannot be judged merely by the formal existence of its institutions. The real questions are whether these institutions retain the capacity to check power, whether the law is applied equally to all citizens, and whether the State remains institutionally neutral towards political and religious ideologies.
It is in this context that the concept of the “Deeper State” becomes important for understanding contemporary India.
A Concept Different from the “Deep State”
The term “Deep State” generally refers to networks of unelected actors within the military, intelligence agencies, security establishment or bureaucracy that exercise substantial political influence behind or alongside elected governments. India does not fit this conventional model. The Indian military has not established itself as an independent political authority.
The Deeper State is different. It describes a situation in which formal state institutions become increasingly interconnected with political, ideological, social and economic networks, allowing state power to penetrate society more deeply while organisations outside the formal State acquire forms of influence that may resemble state authority.
Christophe Jaffrelot has used the concept of the Deeper State to analyse aspects of contemporary Indian politics. His work particularly examines how formal state institutions, surveillance mechanisms and Hindu-nationalist vigilante networks can interact to create an additional layer of social control.
The question, therefore, is not whether some hidden power has captured the State. It is whether political power, state institutions, ideology, economic interests and social organisations are increasingly reinforcing one another.
Concentration of Power
One of the most significant trends in contemporary Indian governance has been the increasing concentration of executive power at the Centre.
A strong government is not inherently undemocratic. But democracy requires effective institutional checks on executive authority. Parliament, the judiciary, electoral institutions, investigative agencies, regulatory bodies, the media and the federal structure are all part of this constitutional balance.
When their autonomy is weakened, the balance of constitutional power is affected.
Freedom House’s 2026 assessment continues to regard India as a multiparty democracy but places it in the “Partly Free” category. It points to concerns regarding the use of government institutions against political opponents, pressure on journalists and civil society, and restrictions affecting civil liberties.
Such assessments should not be treated as the final word on Indian democracy. They nevertheless raise an important question:
Can democracy remain substantively constitutional if the institutions capable of checking executive power gradually lose their autonomy?
Investigative Agencies and Selective Enforcement
The Enforcement Directorate, Central Bureau of Investigation, National Investigation Agency and Income Tax Department perform important statutory functions. The issue is not their existence but their impartiality and accountability.
When law enforcement appears politically unequal, public confidence in the neutrality of the State is weakened. Persistent concerns about the disproportionate investigation of opposition leaders illustrate this problem.
It would be wrong to treat every investigation as a political conspiracy. But it would be equally wrong to assume that every investigation is automatically impartial.
In a democracy, the legitimacy of investigative agencies depends upon their maintaining equal distance from both government and opposition.
The Police and Informal Power
Citizens experience the State most directly through the police and administration—through FIRs, arrest, investigation, bail and the provision of security.
The problem becomes more serious when formal police authority operates alongside informal ideological pressure. In cases involving cow protection, moral policing, opposition to interfaith relationships and other forms of social surveillance, private groups may attempt to regulate citizens’ behaviour while the administration fails to intervene effectively.
Private pressure can then acquire quasi-state power.
This is an important feature of the Deeper State. The State does not necessarily have to formally delegate authority to an organisation. Political protection, social intimidation and administrative inaction can give private actors considerable power in practice.
The Judiciary: The Last Constitutional Barrier
The judiciary remains one of the most important constitutional safeguards against excessive concentration of power.
Indian courts have repeatedly restrained governments and protected fundamental rights. Yet concerns regarding judicial independence, appointments, delays and unequal access to justice remain.
Formal judicial independence is therefore not enough. Its real significance lies in whether courts can protect citizens and minorities even against popular majorities and powerful governments.
If the judiciary becomes institutionally weaker, the distance between constitutional rights on paper and rights in practice can grow.
Parliament and Federalism
Democracy is not simply the formation of a government through majority rule. Parliament must scrutinise the executive, examine legislation and provide space for public deliberation.
When parliamentary scrutiny weakens, the balance of power shifts towards the executive.
Federalism provides another important constitutional safeguard. The existence of governments controlled by different political parties preserves political alternatives and limits excessive centralisation. Excessive political influence through central institutions, financial mechanisms or gubernatorial offices can weaken this balance.
Ideology, the RSS and the Deeper State
It would be inappropriate to equate the RSS directly with the State. There is also insufficient evidence to claim that all major Indian institutions are under RSS control.
The significance of the RSS lies instead in its long-term social and ideological networks.
A political party can lose an election; a deeply embedded social organisation and ideology can remain active.
The important question, therefore, is whether Hindutva’s ideological presence is confined to electoral politics or whether it has acquired sufficient depth in education, culture, social organisations, public discourse and the broader institutional environment.
This is where the concept of the Deeper State becomes more useful than the conventional idea of a Deep State. It is concerned not with a secret government but with the growing interaction between formal and informal centres of power.
Media, Digital Surveillance and Economic Power
The power of the modern State extends beyond police and administration. Information, technology and economic resources have become major instruments of power.
Concentration of media ownership, pressure on journalists, online intimidation, disinformation and digital surveillance can affect citizens’ ability to form independent political judgments.
Similarly, excessive concentration of political and corporate power can raise questions about the independence of regulatory institutions and the fairness of public policy.
The Deeper State must therefore be understood through at least five interconnected dimensions:
political power, administrative power, ideological power, informational power and economic power.
The Implications for Dalits and Minorities
The most serious test of the Deeper State is how it treats vulnerable citizens.
For Muslims, Dalits, Adivasis and other marginalised groups, constitutional democracy means much more than the right to vote. It means equal protection of law, dignity, liberty, access to justice and protection from discrimination and violence.
From an Ambedkarite perspective, political democracy cannot survive without social democracy. If state institutions begin to view citizens primarily through caste, religion, community, political affiliation or ideological loyalty, constitutional citizenship is weakened.
The question of the Deeper State is therefore not merely institutional. It is fundamentally a question of social justice and equal citizenship.
Has India Become a Deeper State?
It would be premature to describe India as a fully established Deeper State.
Electoral competition remains significant. Opposition parties remain politically relevant. Different parties govern different states. The judiciary continues to exercise independent authority in many cases, and civil society and social movements remain active. The 2024 Lok Sabha election demonstrated that voters can still alter the political balance.
At the same time, several developments point towards a deeper transformation: the centralisation of executive power, concerns about the selective use of investigative agencies, pressure on institutional autonomy, the growing ideological presence of Hindutva in public life, informal social policing, pressure on the media and increasing concentration of economic power.
No single development proves the existence of a Deeper State.
What matters is their cumulative and mutually reinforcing effect.
The more accurate conclusion, therefore, is that India is exhibiting significant characteristics of a Deeper State, although its full institutional consolidation has not yet occurred.
Constitutional Morality as the Decisive Safeguard
For Ambedkar, constitutional government was not merely a matter of institutional design. It required a political culture committed to liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of law and institutional restraint.
Constitutional morality requires the State to remain neutral towards its citizens.
A public official cannot place personal ideology above constitutional duty. A police officer cannot substitute religious or caste hierarchy for the law. A judge cannot subordinate constitutional rights to popular prejudice. A political executive cannot treat political opposition as an enemy of the State.
The decisive question is therefore:
When political or ideological loyalty conflicts with constitutional duty, which one prevails?
If constitutional duty prevails, democratic institutions retain their integrity.
If ideological loyalty begins to override constitutional obligation, the neutrality of the State is compromised.
Conclusion
India has not become a Deep State in the conventional sense, nor have its democratic institutions disappeared. But the emergence of significant characteristics of a Deeper State cannot be ignored.
The concept is useful because it helps us understand how democratic institutions can remain formally intact while the actual balance of power changes.
The greatest danger of a Deeper State is not necessarily a dramatic constitutional coup. It is the gradual erosion of institutional neutrality from within.
Parliament may continue to function, elections may continue to be held, courts may continue to deliver judgments and governments may continue to change. Yet if law enforcement becomes selective, institutions become politically dependent, informal ideological groups acquire coercive influence, media freedom contracts, surveillance expands and vulnerable communities cease to experience the State as neutral, constitutional democracy is progressively weakened.
The decisive question for India’s future is therefore not simply who wins elections, but whether the Constitution remains stronger than the government, stronger than the majority, and stronger than political and ideological power.
From an Ambedkarite perspective, the ultimate question is:
Will the Indian State remain the guardian of equal citizenship, or will it increasingly become an instrument through which dominant political, social and ideological forces penetrate society more deeply?
If the Constitution continues to control the exercise of State power, democracy can remain vibrant. But if the State begins to control the meaning and operation of the Constitution, the outer structure of democracy may survive while its constitutional substance gradually erodes.
