THE ASIAN INDEPENDENT UK
Bal Ram Sampla
Geopolitics
The story of how Dr. B.R. Ambedkar became India’s first Law Minister in Nehru’s cabinet has long been told as a tale of Mahatma Gandhi’s magnanimity. According to this popular narrative, Gandhi personally recommended Ambedkar for the cabinet as an “extraordinary act of reconciliation.” However, recent scholarly research reveals a far more complex and fascinating reality that challenges this conventional wisdom.
Why the Gandhi Story Doesn’t Add Up
The traditional narrative falls apart when we examine the bitter relationship between Gandhi and Ambedkar in the 1940s. Ambedkar had written a scathing critique of Gandhi in his book “What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables,” systematically exposing Gandhi’s paternalistic approach toward Dalits and criticizing Congress policies as mere tokenism.
This book created deep bitterness between the two leaders. Gandhi felt exposed and humiliated by Ambedkar’s sharp analysis. The tensions were so severe that Woodrow Wyatt, who was part of Parliamentary Group to visit India and personal assistant to Stafford Cripps of the Cabinet Mission. He documented in his book “Confessions of an Optimist” that Gandhi told them they should not meet or talk to Ambedkar, labelling him as one of the “bad men” along with M.N. Roy. Given this level of hostility, the idea that Gandhi would personally recommend Ambedkar for a cabinet position seems highly implausible.
A Web of Negotiations
Thanks to detailed research by historians like Ramachandra Guha and Ashok Gopal, we now know that Ambedkar’s cabinet appointment resulted from a complex web of negotiations involving multiple intermediaries and influences.
The Domestic Mediators
1. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur
India’s first Health Minister and a close associate of Gandhi, played a crucial role as an intermediary. A Christian of Sikh background. According to Ramachandra Guha’s research in “Gandhi: The Years That Changed the World, 1914-1948”:
(I) Amrit Kaur was impressed with Ambedkar’s contributions to the Fundamental Rights Committee
(II) After meeting with Ambedkar, she learned that he “would like to come to an agreement with Congress”
(III) She persuaded Ambedkar to consider dropping his demand for separate electorates in favour of joint electorates
(IV) Amrit Kaur conveyed these conversations to key Congress leaders including Nehru, Rajagopalachari, and Kripalani
(V) When she discussed this with Gandhi, he initially wrote back that Ambedkar’s demands could not be conceded
2. The Patel Connection: Another Key Player
Ramachandra Guha’s research reveals yet another crucial intermediary in the Ambedkar negotiations:
3. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
In July 1946, Dr. Ambedkar met with Patel through trade unionist N.M. Joshi to discuss a possible alliance between the Congress and the Scheduled Caste Federation.
The correspondence between Patel and Gandhi about this potential alliance is revealing:
(I) Patel wrote to Gandhi about the proposed alliance with Ambedkar
(II) Gandhi initially replied that it was a “risk”
(III) Patel persisted, making a strong case for the alliance with Ambedkar
(IV) Gandhi eventually relented, writing: “If you see no risk in it, what is there for me to say? Do by all means settle with Ambedkar”
This exchange shows that by mid-1946, serious discussions about bringing Ambedkar into the Congress fold were already underway, and that Gandhi was initially reluctant but eventually gave Patel permission to proceed.
3. Jagjivanji Ram
A curious case of Jagivan Ram who was in the Congress. He played a mediating role. However, different sources provide conflicting accounts of exactly how this mediation worked:
According to Ramachandra Guha’s research, Jagjivanji Ram wrote to Gandhi arguing that if their “old adversary” (Ambedkar) would join hands with them, this might ensure that “the problem of the Scheduled Caste is solved before it takes a serious turn and goes adrift like the Muslim question.”
This suggests Jagjivanji Ram took the initiative to approach Gandhi about including Ambedkar.
But Indrani Jagjivan Ram, in her memoir “Milestone: A Memoir,” provides a completely different version. She writes that Ambedkar would visit their home often, and one day Ambedkar himself suggested that Jagjivan Ram should have a word with Gandhi about including him in the cabinet. He sought Patel first for advice, he said do what you think is right.
According to this account, it was Ambedkar who requested Jagjivan Ram’s intervention, not Jagjivan Ram taking independent initiative.
Furthermore, Indrani Jagjivan Ram’s account does not make sense. It’s a complete contradiction. Patel was already having talks with Gandhi over Ambedkar. If for some reason it was before Patel/Gandhi discussion. Gandhi was hostile to Ambedkar as Woodrow Wyatt wrote.
This contradiction is crucial because it shows how family memoirs can sometimes misremember or misinterpret.
Congress Commitment
The Congress commitment to Ambedkar went beyond just cabinet inclusion. In December 1946, Ambedkar was elected from a Bengal province seat. However, with the partition of India, Ambedkar lost his seat as that area went to Pakistan. Patel took decisive action to ensure Ambedkar remained politically viable:
(I) Patel asked B.G. Kher, the Chief Minister of Bombay Presidency, to make arrangements for Ambedkar’s election
(II) A Congress member was persuaded to vacate his seat
(III) Ambedkar was then elected in that member’s place
This demonstrates that the Congress, particularly under Patel’s direction, was actively working to maintain Ambedkar’s political position and ensure his continued participation in the constitutional process.
The International Dimension
Perhaps most surprisingly, Ashok Gopal’s book “A Part Apart” reveals an international dimension to Ambedkar’s appointment that has been largely overlooked. According to Gopal’s research:
(I) Eamon de Valera
The Irish nationalist leader, recommended Ambedkar’s name to either Viceroy Mountbatten or Nehru
(II) Edwina Mountbatten
Wrote an undated letter to Ambedkar expressing her personal satisfaction that he was “supervising” the constitution-making process
(III) She described Ambedkar as “the only genius who can give equal justice to every class and creed”
This international recognition of Ambedkar’s capabilities suggests that progressive networks beyond India understood his unique qualifications for constitutional work.
The Turning Point: April to July 1947
The crucial transformation occurred between April and July 1947. In April, Gandhi had rejected Ambedkar’s demands outright. But by July 11, Nehru was writing to C. Rajagopalachari that he had spoken to Ambedkar and that Ambedkar had agreed to join the cabinet.
What Changed?
Several factors contributed to this dramatic shift:
(I) The Partition Crisis
The looming partition of India into India and Pakistan created an unprecedented national emergency.
(II) Strategic Calculations
Ambedkar recognized that his bargaining position had fundamentally changed. A fragmented India might not be able to guarantee even the basic protections that joint electorates with reservations could provide.
(III) Constitutional requirement
The new nation desperately needed the best legal and constitutional minds available. Ambedkar’s expertise was simply needed for the massive task of constitution-making.
Another Version Emerges
Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma of Assam made a startling claim.
According to CM Sarma and some sources, Nehru wanted Sir Ivor Jennings, a British constitutional expert. However, when Nehru approached Gandhi for approval in late July 1947, Gandhi rejected the proposal, reportedly saying “When we are sending the foreigners away, why a foreigner again?” Instead, Gandhi insisted on Ambedkar, recognizing his “intellect and ability,” and recommended him for both the position of Law Minister and Chairman of the Drafting Committee.
The Contradictions Are Striking
This conflicting version raises several puzzling questions:
1. Why would Gandhi, who was reportedly so hostile to Ambedkar, suddenly champion him over a British expert?
2. How does this reconcile with the detailed accounts of Rajkumari Amrit Kaur’s mediation efforts and the complex negotiations described by Ramachandra Guha?
3. Is this yet another attempt to give Gandhi retroactive credit for Ambedkar’s appointment?
4. Could multiple scenarios have occurred – Nehru supposedly asked his sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, to approach Jennings. It was Jennings who said that Ambedkar was very capable to draft the constitution. This story is repeated often but needs verification from scholars.
Different political parties and historians may be promoting versions that serve their contemporary political purposes.
Each version might contain elements of truth, but none captures the complete picture of what was likely a very complex process.
Conclusion
The real story of Ambedkar’s cabinet appointment reveals just how complex historical truth can be.
Understanding these competing stories helps us appreciate not just Ambedkar’s remarkable journey to the cabinet, but also how historical narratives are constructed.
Regardless of which version is most accurate, all accounts recognize that Ambedkar’s inclusion was essential for India’s constitutional success. Whether through Gandhi’s recognition, Nehru’s pragmatism, or the efforts of multiple intermediaries, the outcome was the same: India got the constitutional architect it needed. This understanding gives Ambedkar his proper due as someone whose inclusion was not an act of charity by anyone, but a recognition of indispensable talent that the new nation could not afford to ignore.
References
1. French, Patrick. India
2. Ram, Indrani Jagjivan. Milestone: A Memoir
3.Wyatt, Woodrow. Confessions of a Optmist
4. Lelyveld, Joseph. Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and his struggle with India.
5. Wolpert, Stanley. Nehru: a tryst with destiny
6.Guha, Ramachandra. Gandhi. The Years That Changed the World 1914-1948
7. Gopal, Ashok. A Part Apart: The life and thought of BR Ambedkar
8.https://www.constitutionofindia.net/members/rajkumari-amrit-kaur/
9.https://www.socialnews.xyz/2025/01/27/nehru-opposed-inclusion-of-ambedkars-name-in-constitution-drafting-committee-alleges-assam-cm/
