Presentation by SR Darapuri, National President, All India Peoples Front
Courtesy: Grok
(Asian independent) Kanshi Ram’s Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) formed alliances with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Uttar Pradesh three times between 1995 and 2002. Below, I address whether these alliances were precalculated or momentary, their impact on Dalit politics and the struggle against Brahmanism, and whether they helped the BJP/Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) gain acceptance among Dalits.
Were the Alliances Precalculated or Momentary?
The BSP’s alliances with the BJP were largely **momentary and pragmatic**, driven by immediate political necessities rather than a long-term ideological alignment. Kanshi Ram, a strategic thinker, prioritized political power as a tool for Dalit empowerment, encapsulated in his slogan, “political power is the master key.” His approach was rooted in the belief that weak coalition governments, reliant on BSP support, would allow Dalits to wield influence and challenge the dominance of upper-caste-led parties. The alliances were tactical responses to specific political contexts:
- 1995 Alliance:After the collapse of the BSP-Samajwadi Party (SP) coalition due to the infamous 1995 Lucknow guest house incident, where SP cadres allegedly attacked Mayawati, the BSP sought BJP support to form a government. This was a momentary decision to stabilize Mayawati’s position as Chief Minister and counter SP hostility.
- 1997 Alliance:Following the hung assembly in the 1996 Uttar Pradesh elections, the BSP again allied with the BJP in a rotational chief ministership arrangement. This was a calculated move to secure power, but it was short-lived due to internal disagreements.
- 2002 Alliance:Post-2002 elections, the BSP and BJP formed another coalition government. This was a pragmatic step to regain power after the BSP’s electoral setbacks, but it collapsed within a year due to mutual distrust.
While Kanshi Ram’s strategy involved leveraging alliances to gain power, the BJP’s ideological alignment with the RSS, which promotes Hindutva and is often seen as reinforcing Brahmanical structures, made these partnerships controversial. Critics argue that Kanshi Ram’s willingness to ally with the BJP was opportunistic, as he had previously labeled the BJP as the “most corrupt” party. However, Kanshi Ram justified such moves as necessary to weaken “majority governments” that he believed were despotic toward the Bahujan Samaj. The alliances were not deeply precalculated as part of a long-term strategy but were instead reactive, aimed at securing immediate political gains in a fragmented electoral landscape.
Impact on Dalit Politics and the Struggle Against Brahmanism
The BSP-BJP alliances had a complex and largely detrimental impact on Dalit politics and the struggle against Brahmanism:
- Short-Term Gains in Political Power:
– The alliances enabled Mayawati to become Chief Minister multiple times, a historic achievement for a Dalit woman in Uttar Pradesh, the epicenter of caste-based politics. This instilled a sense of pride and political consciousness among Dalits, reinforcing Kanshi Ram’s vision of capturing the “temple of power” for emancipation
– Programs like the Ambedkar Village Scheme, which allocated funds for the development of Dalit-majority villages, provided tangible socio-economic benefits, enhancing the BSP’s appeal among Dalits.
- Erosion of Ideological Clarity:
– The alliances diluted the BSP’s anti-Brahmanism stance, as the BJP and RSS are widely perceived as upholding Brahmanical hegemony through their Hindutva ideology. Kanshi Ram’s original vision, inspired by Ambedkar and Phule, was to unite Dalits, OBCs, and minorities against caste oppression. Aligning with the BJP confused the BSP’s cadre and alienated sections of its core Dalit base, who saw it as a betrayal of the anti-caste struggle.
– Critics argued that the BSP’s opportunistic alliances compromised its radical roots, shifting its focus from social justice to power politics. This was evident in the BSP’s later “Sarvajan” strategy (2007), which courted upper castes, further diluting its Bahujan identity.
- Fragmentation of Dalit Unity:
– The alliances created disillusionment among Dalit activists and voters, who felt that the BSP was prioritizing power over ideology. This led to the emergence of new Dalit leaders like Chandrashekhar Azad, whose Azad Samaj Party (ASP) aimed to reclaim Kanshi Ram’s radical vision.
– The BSP’s reliance on Jatav voters (Mayawati’s sub-caste) and failure to consolidate non-Jatav Dalits further weakened its base, as non-Jatav Dalits began gravitating toward the BJP, which offered patronage and representation.
- Weakening the Anti-Brahmanism Struggle:
– By aligning with the BJP, the BSP inadvertently legitimized a party whose ideology is antithetical to Ambedkarite principles. This undermined the broader struggle against Brahmanism, as it signaled a willingness to compromise with forces that reinforce caste hierarchies.
– The alliances also shifted the BSP’s focus from grassroots mobilization to electoral politics, reducing its role as a movement for social transformation. This was a departure from Kanshi Ram’s earlier emphasis on organizations like BAMCEF and DS4, which prioritized community empowerment.
Did the Alliances Help BJP/RSS Gain Acceptance Among Dalits?
The BSP-BJP alliances significantly aided the BJP and RSS in gaining acceptance among Dalits, particularly non-Jatav sub-castes, through a combination of political patronage and ideological outreach:
- Political Patronage and Representation:
– The BJP capitalized on the alliances to project itself as a viable alternative for Dalits, especially non-Jatavs like Pasis, Valmikis, and Khatiks, who felt marginalized within the BSP’s Jatav-centric politics. By offering ministerial berths and local leadership roles, the BJP attracted Dalit leaders and voters.
– The BJP’s narrative of “saving” Mayawati during the 1995 guest house incident was used to appeal to Dalit voters, portraying the party as a protector of Dalit interests against SP aggression.
- RSS’s Cultural Outreach:
– The RSS intensified its “samarasta” (social harmony) campaign, which sought to integrate Dalits into the Hindu fold while downplaying caste distinctions. This included organizing events like Ambedkar Jayanti celebrations and promoting micro-caste identities to fragment Dalit unity.
– The BJP’s emphasis on Hindu nationalism, exemplified by the Ram Temple movement, resonated with some Dalits who were drawn to a unified Hindu identity, especially in the absence of a strong BSP alternative
- Electoral Gains:
– The alliances allowed the BJP to erode the BSP’s non-Jatav Dalit base. Post-2007, the BJP’s success in Uttar Pradesh elections (2014, 2017, 2019) was partly due to its ability to attract non-Jatav Dalits and OBCs, who were disillusioned with the BSP’s alliances and Mayawati’s leadership.
– The BSP’s electoral decline—winning zero seats in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and only one seat in the 2022 UP assembly elections—reflected a shift of Dalit votes to the BJP, facilitated by the earlier alliances.
- Ideological Penetration:
– The BJP/RSS used the alliances to normalize their presence in Dalit communities, framing Hindutva as inclusive. This was particularly effective among younger Dalits who had not experienced the BSP’s peak mobilization in the 1990s
– However, the BJP’s gains were not uniform. Jatav voters, the BSP’s core base, largely remained loyal to Mayawati, but their loyalty waned over time due to the BSP’s ideological compromises and electoral losses.
Conclusion
The BSP’s alliances with the BJP were primarily momentary and pragmatic, driven by Kanshi Ram’s strategy of capturing political power to empower Dalits. While they achieved short-term gains, such as Mayawati’s chief ministerships and socio-economic schemes for Dalits, they compromised the BSP’s anti-Brahmanism stance and alienated sections of its base. The alliances significantly aided the BJP/RSS in gaining acceptance among non-Jatav Dalits through patronage, cultural outreach, and the BSP’s weakened ideological position. This contributed to the BJP’s electoral dominance in Uttar Pradesh and the broader decline of the BSP, pushing Dalit politics to a crossroads where new leaders and parties are attempting to revive Kanshi Ram’s vision.
